White Papers

In our third annual report, published in late Fall 2023, we provide highlights of the many activities of the Observatory during the academic year 2022-2023, roughly, as well as updates on the growing OSoMe team.

In our second annual report, published in Fall 2022, we provide updates on the Observatory's team, research, tools, teaching, visitors, grants, and impact during the academic year 2021-2022.

Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. During the early weeks of the invasion it became clear that the war was also fought in the arena of public opinion, around the world. In our previous work we reported on a sharp increase in the number of new accounts created in the first days after the invasion, and on multiple groups of accounts sharing suspiciously similar messages. In this analysis, we focus on accounts created during the first week of the Russian invasion, when new account creation was at its peak. We are motivated by the hypothesis that newer accounts are more likely to be inauthentic. For instance, these new accounts could include automated and sock-puppet accounts put in place to coordinate campaigns and manipulate online conversations. Preliminary analysis about the spike in the creation of new accounts around the date of the invasion does not demonstrate evidence of a substantial Russian incursion into the Twittersphere.

On February 24, 2022, Russia began a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. The global scale of national interests related to the invasion means that public opinion in many countries is likely to play a significant role in the conflict. In turn, social media can play a key role in shaping public opinion in geopolitical events. Consequently, the potential to exploit social vulnerabilities through social media is of great concern. Detecting and monitoring these kinds of abuse is part of our mission at the Observatory on Social Media. We present some preliminary results about a dramatic spike in the creation of new accounts around the date of the invasion, and about several networks of accounts sharing suspiciously similar content.

In our first annual report, published in Spring 2021, we provide updates on the Observatory's research, collaborations, and externally-funded projects and partnerships during the academic year 2020-2021.

Indiana University’s Observatory on Social Media (OSoMe) continues to track widely circulated but unsupported narratives in public discourse, with the goal to assess the public’s awareness of them, the extent to which they are believed, and whether a person’s political leanings, media use, and personal traits are related to vulnerability to these narratives. The first six waves were pre-election surveys. This is a report on our 8th wave of data, collected post-election.

Wave 8 (Jul 20 - Aug 3, 2021): Data

Indiana University’s Observatory on Social Media (OSoMe) continues to track widely circulated but unsupported narratives in public discourse, with the goal to assess the public’s awareness of them, the extent to which they are believed, and whether a person’s political leanings, media use, and personal traits are related to vulnerability to these narratives. The first six waves were pre-election surveys. This is a report on our 7th wave of data, collected post-election.

Wave 7 (June 6 - 14, 2021): Data

OSoMe periodically engages in survey work to examine audience and user trends in relation to social media. All elections feature claims and counterclaims by contending parties. The 2020 election seems to be an especially salient example, as conspiracy theories and a variety of misleading narratives, many of which can be debunked with professional fact-checking, are rampant. Our team tracked widely circulated narratives throughout the 2020 election, with the goal to assess the public’s awareness of them, the extent to which they are believed, and whether one’s political leaning is related to vulnerability to these narratives.

Here we summarize the results of the first six waves.

OSoMe periodically engages in survey work to examine audience and user trends in relation to social media. All elections feature claims and counterclaims by contending parties. The 2020 election seems to be an especially salient example, as conspiracy theories and a variety of misleading narratives, many of which can be debunked with professional fact-checking, are rampant. Our team tracked widely circulated narratives throughout the 2020 election, with the goal to assess the public’s awareness of them, the extent to which they are believed, and whether one’s political leaning is related to vulnerability to these narratives.

Wave 6 (Nov 18 - 27, 2020): Data

OSoMe periodically engages in survey work to examine audience and user trends in relation to social media. All elections feature claims and counterclaims by contending parties. The 2020 election seems to be an especially salient example, as conspiracy theories and a variety of misleading narratives, many of which can be debunked with professional fact-checking, are rampant. Our team tracked widely circulated narratives throughout the 2020 election, with the goal to assess the public’s awareness of them, the extent to which they are believed, and whether one’s political leaning is related to vulnerability to these narratives.

Wave 5 (Oct 27 - Nov 2, 2020): Data

OSoMe periodically engages in survey work to examine audience and user trends in relation to social media. All elections feature claims and counterclaims by contending parties. The 2020 election seems to be an especially salient example, as conspiracy theories and a variety of misleading narratives, many of which can be debunked with professional fact-checking, are rampant. Our team tracked widely circulated narratives throughout the 2020 election, with the goal to assess the public’s awareness of them, the extent to which they are believed, and whether one’s political leaning is related to vulnerability to these narratives.

Wave 4 (Oct 15 - 24, 2020): Data

OSoMe periodically engages in survey work to examine audience and user trends in relation to social media. All elections feature claims and counterclaims by contending parties. The 2020 election seems to be an especially salient example, as conspiracy theories and a variety of misleading narratives, many of which can be debunked with professional fact-checking, are rampant. Our team tracked widely circulated narratives throughout the 2020 election, with the goal to assess the public’s awareness of them, the extent to which they are believed, and whether one’s political leaning is related to vulnerability to these narratives.

Wave 3 (Oct 2 - 13, 2020): Data

OSoMe periodically engages in survey work to examine audience and user trends in relation to social media. All elections feature claims and counterclaims by contending parties. The 2020 election seems to be an especially salient example, as conspiracy theories and a variety of misleading narratives, many of which can be debunked with professional fact-checking, are rampant. Our team tracked widely circulated narratives throughout the 2020 election, with the goal to assess the public’s awareness of them, the extent to which they are believed, and whether one’s political leaning is related to vulnerability to these narratives.

Wave 2 (Sep 9 - 26, 2020): Data

OSoMe periodically engages in survey work to examine audience and user trends in relation to social media. All elections feature claims and counterclaims by contending parties. The 2020 election seems to be an especially salient example, as conspiracy theories and a variety of misleading narratives, many of which can be debunked with professional fact-checking, are rampant. Our team tracked widely circulated narratives throughout the 2020 election, with the goal to assess the public’s awareness of them, the extent to which they are believed, and whether one’s political leaning is related to vulnerability to these narratives.

Wave 1 (Aug 20 - Sep 7, 2020): Data